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The equivalence between public sector deficit and private 
sector excess savings is demonstrated. Figures for the 
Nordic countries concerning public deficit, debt and 
interest rates are presented.
The relationship between public deficit and public debt 
is discussed - stressing the importance of the size of 
the permanent deficit and of the real rate of interest.
The conditions for a stable/unstable development in the 
debt/GDP ratio are set up. Here the relative size between 
real growth rate and real interest rate is crucial. The 
possibilities of increasing the growth rate respectively 
reducing the interest rate is discussed and the mutual 
interrelationship is underlined.
The paper is concluded with a rather pessimistic view, 
looking at the OECD-area the deficit has been reduced 
by restrictive fiscal policies at the cost of growing 
unemployment. Real rates og interest stay high and far 
higher than the likely growth rate of the world economy. 
That creates an unstable situation calling for continuous 
reductions in public exoences or tax increases both damag­
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Jesper Jespersen May 1985
SOME REFLEXIONS ON THE LONGER TERM CONSEQUENCES OF A MOUNTING 
1 )PUBLIC DEBT
I.1 Introduction
1. The public concern over indebtedness in the Nordic
countries was initiated by the first oil price hike back in 
1973/1974. The culmination came in 1981/82,
when rather long-lasting governments were overthrown by the 
voters, because the feeling that"something had to be done" was 
very present. This political change was to some extent moti­
vated by the longer run consequences of a mounting public 
debt building up for seven years or even more.
2. The analysis of the public sector, the public defi­
cit and stabilization policies in general is often interwoven 
to an extent that makes it rather diffuse and confused.
This essay will neither be about the reasons behind 
the intervention of the public sector into the national econ­
omy nor about the "optimal size" of the public sector. ■ But 
let me recapitulate, that the intervention of the public sec­
tor alters the income distribution as compared to what would be produced 
by pure market forces. The size and aim of this redis­
tribution is mainly, if not solely, a political task. Capi­
tal markets are not perfect; the public sector lending, bor­
rowing and (net) taxing may overcome some of these deficien­
cies. On the other hand, when taxes and transfers are not of 
a lump sum type, they create suboptimal outcomes when evalu­
ated by the market clearing model.
Since none of us know whether an equilibrium or




























































































proper one, I will not pursue these aspects, nor the discus­
sion of the appropriateness of stabilization policy (either 
in the short or longer run).
3. The scope of my presentation is more limited. I 
take the economic structure as given. It exhibits
a considerable public sector, cfr. table 1, the size ranging 
from 23 per cent of GDP in Finland to 34 per cent in Sweden 
(1982). Taxation and transfers are related mainly to income and 
consumption; taxes amount to 38 per cent of GDP in Finland 
and 51 per cent in Sweden, cfr. table 1.
My discussion will mainly be devoted to the ques­
tion; what determines the public sector deficit in the long­
er run, or what are the most important elements in the proc­
ess of deficit dynamics?
4. Before going into that discussion, it might be 
useful to take a look at a few figures showing the development 
of the public debt in the Nordic context, together with a
few remarks concerning why the budget deficit has
emerged as a general phenomenon in nearly all market econo­
mies. I will stress the link between the short run flow
performance and the longer run stock consequences.
I.2 Nordic Perspectives
5. Although the Nordic countries are quite similar in 
many respects, their experiences concerning the development 




























































































Table 1 Some Economie facts about the Nordic Countries
A: Macroeconomic development.
Real Growth (GDP) Balance of payments Unenployment
1 964-73 197 3-82 1964-73 1973-82 1973 1982
pet. p. a. ---- ----  pet. of GDP —  oer cent —
Sweden 3.6 1.4 +0.2 t NJ o 2.5 3.1
Denmark 3.9 1.7 -2. 1 -3.2 1.1 9.8
Norway 4.2 3.7 -1,4 -4.3 1.5 2.6
Finland 5. 1 2.7 -1 .5 -2.4 2.3 5.8







1973 1982 1973 1982 1973 1982 1973 1982 1973 1982
Sweden 42.5 50.6 31.a 34.3 17.0 33.8 0.9 12.6 +4.1 -7.1
Denmark 42.4 44.1 26.9 30.5 14.3 28.2 0.2 5.0 +5.2 -9.2
Norway 47.4 48.7 22.0 24.9 21.7 25.615 1.0 2.5 +9.7 +6.7






























































































Norway has gained from the oil and gas production, 
which has solved both the country's balance of payments and 
the public sector deficit problems.
Finland never really plunged into a significant defi­
cit. Accordingly, the central government debt only amounts to 
15 per cent of GNP.
As one can see from figure 1, it is Denmark and Swe­
den who have experienced a severe government sector deficit in 
recent years. Measured as a percentage of GNP, both countries 
passed the 10 per cent mark in 1982. The accumulating defi­
cits in these two countries have caused a fast growing public 
debt which in 1984 comes close to 2/3 of GNP.
Although there are many similarities in the economic 
performance of Denmark and Sweden, the two countries have experienced 
a very different development in the long term bond rate during 
the last decade, cf. figure 2. In this paper it is argued 
that the considerably lower rate of interest in Sweden has 
been made possible by a much more administratively organized 
financial regime, which makes it far easier to handle
the problems posed by the escalating public debt, cf. figure 3.
2 )II. The deficit in the short run
II.1 A closed economy
6. In a closed society the public sector deficit mirrors 
excess saving in the private sector:
(1) G - T (Y) + i B = Y - C (Y) - T (Y) + i-B - IP
Y - GDP, current prices



























































































Figure 1 Public sector deficits in the Nordic Countries.
+5̂
Finland /
\   ̂\X. v\X t  ̂• v v\
73" 74 75 76 77 75 " 79 ~ 8Ó 81 8$.' 85 84
-2
Actual deficit
------ - —  - —  Structural deficit, net of interest
Source: OECD, 1984b, table 2,1 & 2,7
Note: The structural deficit is calculated by a 1peak-through-peak' method
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T(Y) - net taxes (excl. interest payments), dependent on GDP 
i - nominal rate of interest (net of tax)
B - market value of the public debt
C(Y) - private consumption, current prices
- private real investment in current prices
By excess saving is meant financial savings larger 
than real private investments. One cannot a priori say 
whether the private sector will be in a state of excess sav­
ings or excess investments. Any morally based statements 
about what ought to be the situation are disregarded.
II.2 An open economy
7. Introducing the foreign sector makes the analysis 
less clear-cut:
(2) G - T(Y) + i-B = Y - C (Y) - T(Y) +i-B-Ip+ f-F + M(Y) - E(Yf,Pd/Pf) - f-F
public sector private sector ~~v'~foreign sector
f ~ the foreign rate of interest
F ~ market value of foreign debt (an asset to the private 
sector)
M(Y)~ imports at current prices (dependent on GDP)
E ~ exports at current prices (dependent on foreign GDP (Ŷ ) and 
relative prices (Pd/p ))
In this case the public sector deficit is mirrored 
not only by the excess saving of the private sector, but also 
by the excess saving of the foreign sector. Excess saving of 
the foreign sector is normally labeled as the current account 
deficit.^
(2a) So
So excess saving = financial surplus in the 




























































































II.3 Cyclical changes in the deficit
8. The cause of a substantial short run public sector 
deficit--or even better, of a change in the deficit— can be 
found in any one of the three sectors.
If the public sector expenditures and receipts were 
entirely exogenous, a change in the deficit could only emerge 
from deliberate actions within the public sector (decided up­
on by politicians). A fall in effective demand would
then, in a closed economy, have to be borne by the 
private sector. Income, and with it employment, are forced 
to decline until the private ex ante saving equilibrates in­
vestments. This is a vicious cycle, because investment is, 
among other things, directed by expected profit and produc­
tion. When the actual demand and income are declining, then 
the expectations about future demand are revised downwards.
The foreign sector may act as an automatic stabiliz­
er if the exogenous shock is an internal one. In that case 
the adjustment will be borne partly by higher domestic unem­
ployment and partly by the foreign sector through improvement 
of the balance of payments (indicating increased unemploy­
ment abroad as well). The more open the country (or region) 
is, the more the balance of payments will adjust to an inter­
nal demand change in the tradeable goods sector. If the mar­
ginal propensity to import is 100 and the country is small, 
then any change in demand spills over entirely to the foreign 
sector, leaving domestic production and employment unchanged.
9. The analogy with the public sector is straightfor­




























































































sate 100 per cent any fall in private sector income, then, of 
course, no change in employment occurs.
10. The cyclical change in the public sector deficit 
(psd) then becomes a function of the automatic stabilizers 
represented by the marginal net tax rate and the marginal pro­
pensity to import. These rates are calculated as marginal to 
changes in real demand. In addition the impact on private 
real investments of any exogenous shock is important for the 
development in the psd along with the nature of the shock.
Those countries with high marginal tax rates and rel­
atively generous unemployment benefits and a small or medium­
sized propensity to import, like the Nordic countries, will be 
rather exposed to drastic changes in the budget balance. Also 
the volatility of private investments is important. The fewer 
nationalized or subsidized industries, the greater fluctua­
tions in investments.
Change in public sector deficit:
(3) 0Apsd = f(mt, mim, I(y ,
psd ~ public sector deficit
mt ~ marginal net tax rate
mim ~ marginal import rate
I (y) ~ private investment
e
y ~ expected production
X ~ exogenous shock
pe _ expected inflation




























































































11.4 Further Nordic Perspectives
11. As can be seen from figure 1, the public sector defi­
cit reacted most dramatically in Denmark in the wake of the 
first oil price hike. Apart from the high marginal rates, 
this was due to the policy of not subsidizing uncompetitive 
firms. Such a policy leads--especially in the short run— to 
more registered unemployment and thus to higher unemployment 
expenditure. In Norway and Sweden the immediate
policy reaction was to keep the firms hit by the world slump 
going by government subsidies. In the short run one may save 
a firm through subsidies of, say, 10 per cent of the firm's 
value added, whereas the unemployment benefit may amount to 50 
per cent or even more, if the firm is closed down. This part­
ly explains why the public deficit reaction is somewhat lag­
ging in Sweden.
Furthermore, in Denmark a very expansive tax policy 
was pursued in 1975, which of course added to the public defi­
cit. This policy was motivated by the— at that time broadly 
held— view that the world recession was only transitory.
The second oil price hike in 1979/80 swept
away any such idea. But at that time the prolonged period of 
substantial deficits had meant the accumulation of a consider­
able debt, cfr. figure 3.
11.5 Financial crowding out
12. Quite often one sees concern expressed about how the 
public sector deficit shall be financed, e.g. OECD, Occasional 
Study, 1983. That concern seems to disregard the above- 




























































































foreign) financial saving. In fact the real multiplier proc­
ess will go on until enough financial saving has been created. 
Especially in cases where the change in the public sector def­
icit is derived from private sector real demand deficiency, 
there must be an ex ante excess demand for financial assets.
In that case the supply of government bills, bonds (and money) 
may twist the term structure of the interest rate, but can 
hardly lever the interest rate level and by that cause finan­
cial crowding out. A dynamic process initiated by a rise in 
the ex ante saving will not in the short run— unless monetary 
policy is conducted in a peculiar way— result in a higher interest rate. 
In fact empirical studies support the theory that the rate of 
interest moves pro-cyclically, i.e. falls when the cyclical 
deficit goes up and vice versa, cf. OECD, 1984, and below.
13. A somewhat different situation arises when the change 
in public deficit originates from an expansive fiscal policy.
Then the ex ante supply of financial assets exceeds the pri­
vate sector ex ante demand. Some extra demand for financial 
assets will come out, somewhat delayed, from the real multi-’ 
plier process within the private sector. As some of the fis­
cal stimulus goes abroad due to the marginal propensity to im­
port, financial crowding out can in this case only be avoided 
if a part of the increased public deficit also is financed 
abroad.
Of course, a fiscal stimulus to an economy without 
vacant resources runs immediately into difficulties if it is 




























































































II.6 Real crowding out
14. As a public sector deficit does not necessarily raise 
the rate of interest, there does not have to be any crowding 
out of private investment through this channel.
But three other crowding out mechanisms can be detect­
ed due to different constraints imposed on the economy by the 
politicians:
1) Balance of payments constraint
2) Inflation constraint
3) Deficit constraint
Politicians may declare that for political reasons specific 
figures are aimed at. These declarations do not have to be 
founded strictly on economic reasoning. Restrictions 1) and 2) 
are not necessarily related to the public sector deficit. On 
the other hand, higher public expenses, increasing the public 
deficit, will at the same time place a further strain on the bal­
ance of payments and the inflation process, and by that call 
for higher taxes. In this respect one might say that pub­
lic demand for goods and services crowds out private production 
due to political commitments.
The crowding out is even more direct if the political 
commitment is related to the public deficit itself. However, 
the real multiplier effects might be of quite different magni­
tude with regard to employment. From the literature the "bal­
anced multiplier effect" is well known. This also counts for 
interest payments but probably with a reversed sign.
From this 'real' point of view interest payments do 




























































































III. Implication of a mounting public debt
111.1 Flow vs. Stock alias Short run vs. Longer run
15. A thorough analysis of a mounting public debt re­
quires a distinction between the flow effects and the stock 
effects. The flow effect is derived from the inpact of the current 
budget deficit, whereas the stock effect stems from the accu­
mulated past deficits constituting the actual public debt.
Fiscal policy is traditionally related to the change 
in the deficit, whereas monetary policy is considered among 
other things to comprise the financing of the debt. These
two policies are of course overlapping when the financial im­
plications of the current deficit are considered.
A third aspect of this analysis is the development 
of the future public debt, given a continuation of the defi­
cit at the current size* This has crucial implications for 
the amount of interest payments in the future. In this dy­
namic aspect, fiscal and monetary policy are highly interde­
pendent .
One ought not to discuss the flow aspect without
taking the longer run stock perspective (and by that, wealth) 
into consideration.
111.2 Is public debt net wealth to the private sector?
16. This question has come up in the literature related 
to the New Classical Economics (see, e.g., Barro, 1974, Tobin 
81). The question is well-motivated and has a long history, 
at least back to Stuart Mill and Ricardo.
The society does not get any richer by increasing 




























































































behind the public debt.
17. Calculating the private wealth, one is not in doubt 
that the banking sector ought to be consolidated. It is the 
private (non-financial) sector that earns the interest pay­
ments on deposits with one hand and pays the interest on bank 
loans with the other. However, the hands belong to differ­
ent households and firms, which implies a distributional ef­
fect .
The same arguments apply nearly as well to the pub­
lic debt. It is the private sector that earns the interest 
payment, but it is also the private sector that pays the tax­
es. A pure example of this relationship would be a case 
where the holders of government bonds were imposed a tax ex­
actly equivalent to the interest they received on the bonds. 
In that case the bonds would be worthless, because no future 
earnings could be expected.
In the real world it is, of course, far from the 
same persons who receive the interest and who pay the extra 
taxes.
18. Two aspects should be followed up. First, what dif­
ference does it make that the debtor(s) of the government 
bonds (contrary to the creditors) are not personified? Sec­
ond, is the public debt a burden to future generations?
19. The holders of government bonds can expect virtually 
without any uncertainty that the bonds will be fulfilled.
But the anonymous taxpayer does not directly observe the same 
obligation of future tax commitment, as opposed to an indi­




























































































tional expectations are assumed (which is synonymous with per­
fect foresight), the taxpayer is fully aware of this future 
commitment. If households start to save contemporaneously 
with public deficit spending, then there will be no effect on 
real demand. This leads to the theorem of the superneutrality 
of public deficits, but the assumptions behind the theorem are 
quite remote from reality.
20. One could also ask whether the increasing public debt 
is a burden to future generations. If the public sector defi­
cit mirrors the private sector's lack of ability to undertake 
real investments balancing the desire to save, then it becomes 
a burden due to the missing stock of real capital. The socie­
ty could have been richer in the future, if the present gener­
ation had been able to employ vacant resources by building up 
real capital. This becomes an extra burden, if the present 
generation in addition awards itself a high rate of interest 
on financial long term savings, which is converted into pur­
chasing power when it has retired from working age. In that 
case the present generation has mismanaged economic develop­
ment and at the same time reserved the lion's share of the un­
duly small GDP for themselves. Thus the public sector deficit 
and the high rate of interest are symptoms of parents exploit­
ing their children!
21. One may pose the question to what extent public debt 
implies higher taxes in the future. To answer this question 
we have to detect the determinants behind the level of taxa­
tion. At that point one should refer back to section II.6, 
where real crowding out through higher taxes was discussed.



























































































the economy and the tax pressure was stressed.
Whenever interest payments or repayment of the debt 
is making any of the constraints tighter, the future tax level 
will— ceteris paribus— be raised. The higher the real rate of 
interest, the more likely it is that this will happen.
If all public debt goes into increased savings for 
pensions, then there is only the wealth effect which might add 
to the actual demand, and taxes have only to be raised a lit­
tle in accordance with that. On the other hand, sometime in 
the future, pensions will start contributing to the demand for 
real goods, and then presumably require higher taxes at that 
time. This is one aspect of the intergenerational problems 
related to the public debt.
22. Summing up the arguments, the public debt may be con­
sidered as private wealth, but not to the full amount. What 
really matters in this case is the degree of economic trans­
parency unveiling the relationship between future interest 
payments and future taxes.
III.3 Does it matter how the budget deficit is financed?
23. Furthermore, the new classical economics pos­
tulate that deficit spending has no real effect independently 




























































































This statement relies upon very strict assumptions, among oth­
ers: perfect foresight, perfect capital markets and continu­
ous life (eventually substituted by intergenerational gifts 
and bequests), cfr. Buiter, 1983. In addition, one implicit 
assumption is that the public debt is expected to be paid back 
sometime in the future. For that purpose households start to 
save contemporaneously with the government's dissaving, exact­
ly offsetting each other.
When the assumption that public debt will be paid 
back is removed,then the superneutrality proposition of public 
debt can be discarded , anyhow.
24. A more conventional assumption applied to the analysis is that the public 
debt may stay continuously as a constant proportion of GDP. That
implies that the public debt is rolled over independently of 
the maturity structure of public bonds.
Accordingly, it is concluded that with regard to the 
saving behaviour of the private sector it really does matter 
whether the intended deficit is financed through taxes or by 
issuing debt instruments. To what extent the choice between 
money and bonds is important I will come back to when discuss­
ing the implications for monetary policy and the long run as­
pects of the deficit.
III.4 The true costs of servicing the public debt
25. It is well known that inflation erodes the real value 
of nominal financial assets. Interest paid to bond holders 
therefore contains a certain element of compensation for ex­
pected inflation. This is not a real cost for the government, 




























































































of the debt service. The inflation component is in fact a kind 
of repayment when the debt is measured in real terms (as a ra­
tio of GDP). Traditional bookkeeping procedures place 
the entire nominal interest payments on the current ac­
count, where at least the inflation-determined component be­
longs to the capital account.
26. If all future inflation were foreseen and no taxation 
of capital income existed, then the Fisher equation for inter­
est determination would presumably hold:
(1) i = r + p
where i ~ nominal rate of interest 
r ~ real rate of interest 
p ~ inflation
27. But what inflation? There are in the real world a 
number of indexes, each showing one aspect of the inflation 
process. More often than not, the relevant price index is dif­
ferent for the creditor and the debtor. The holders of public 
bonds are typically households and pension funds, for which the 
development in consumer prices is of main interest. On the 
contrary, the government's concern is about future tax rates, 
which makes the factor income deflator the most relevant index.
Just to take an example, households are nearly as vulnerable 
towards import prices as towards domestic prices, whereas it is 
only domestic factor income which forms the tax basis. Anyhow, 
the difference between the consumer price index and the GDP-de- 
flator (at factor costs) is only of real importance in periods 
when the terms of foreign trade change considerably. In a 





























































































If all public debt were index-bonds, the problem of 
correcting the public budget would dissolve itself. Only in 
a few countries are such bonds sold more systematically (U.K., 
Italy and Denmark). Traditionally public debt consists of 
short and long term bonds with nominally fixed interest rates, 
which in fact is amazing considering the volatile and unpre­
dictable rate of inflation.
28. When the actual rate of interest on fixed rate bonds 
deviates from the expected rate (perhaps due to changes in 
the expected rate of inflation), the market value changes and 
an unexpected capital gain/loss occurs. Following Eisner & 
Pieper, 1984, the real cost of servicing the public sector 
should include the unexpected capital gains/losses.
But adding or subtracting such unexpected capital 
gains more overestimates the effect on permanent income. Un­
expected changes in the real value of public deficit do not 
add to permanent income (apart from the tiny effect on cur­
rent permanent income coming from the capital changes when 
spread over the entire life period). Thus the unexpected 
changes have a different status from expected ones and there­
fore call for much smaller changes in the tax rates to be 
neutralized.
Working with the concrete data, it may be rather 
difficult to figure out what are expected and what are unex­
pected changes in the capital value of the outstanding debt. 
However, in countries where there are long term nominal and 
index-linked bonds the marginally expected rate of inflation 
is— under assumption of perfect capital markets— straightfor­
ward to calculate.
• 0 1 +  i 0(2) p = (̂— — ~ - 1) x 100 , where £> ~ expected inflation
i ~ nominal rate of in- 
r ~ (real) rate of in- terest




























































































29. When calculating the burden of the actual budget def­
icit, one should deduct from the nominal deficit an item de­
termined by the inflation rate times existing net public debt.
Furthermore, if there is any real growth in the econ­
omy, then the amount of money as a share of GDP falls not only 
because of inflation but also due to real growth.
There will normally be paid a positive real rate of 
interest on the public bond. In cases where the real interest 
rate is lower than the growth rate of the economy, the real 
burden of servicing the bond debt is negative. Accordingly, 
the nominal budget deficit should be corrected for inflation 
and growth in GDP/capita, which both reduce the real burden of 
servicing the public debt.
D ~ current real deficit r ----
D ~ current nominal deficit n
Dc ~ cyclical component 
0^ ~ permanent deficit 
M ~ outside money 
B ~ public bonds, market value 
n ~ growth rate of nominal GDP
i^ - average nominal interest rate on public bonds, net of tax 
Current real deficit;
(III.3) D = D - n*M - p-B - (n - i, )-Br n b
30. One may ask, what are the permanent costs of the
budget deficit? Here the calculation of the current real
deficit D is convenient. Given a constant relationship r
between the stock of money and GDP, D̂ . has to be financed 




























































































penses this adds to the deficit in coming years is the 
long-term real rate of interest (net of tax) times the 
growth of the real value of the public debt which in fact
is D .r
In a longer run perspective it is the permanent
real deficit D which is of main concern. Calculating P
that, one has to correct the current deficit for the av­
erage cyclical component, cf. figure 4 and section 36 be­
low.
Permanent real deficit 
(III.4) D = D - D
IV. The Medium Term Dynamics of the Deficit
IV.1 A little arithmetic
31. Looking into the future, then, the accumulated debt
is a deadweight that cannot be avoided. One may therefore ask 
what is the longer run ratio between debt and GDP, given the 
actual situation. Or one could pose the question a little 
differently: "Will the debt/GDP ratio stabilize in the fu­
ture?" This longer run ratio is of great importance because 
that also gives an indication of the size of the future inter­
est payments. If the deficit is supposed to stay constant as a given 
proportion of GDP, then the growing debt implies higher and
higher interest payments which call for/re'&u'ct'lons in other 
public expenses and/or increased tax rates.
32. If the government deficit D inclusive of net interest 
payments is assumed to form a fixed ratio compared to GDP, the 































































































Different measurements of potential GDP.
/  *L' Full' enploynent GDP
_ . - ■ ----- f\
t-ĵ (1973) t2 (1979) t3 (1984) time
Note: Ful1,employment GDP is defined as the GDP which could have been 
reached, if the percentage of unemployed persons had stay at a 
• level similar to that which was normal upto 1973.
Structural unemployment GDP is the GDP which lies on a straight 
line drawn from one peak of the business cycle to the next one.
This is (in principle) the method behind OECD's Structural deficit. 
Permanent_jinem]D]io^m£2i£l_£2g is the GDP that (in principle) make? 
the public debt grow paralel, hence the debt/GDP ratio stay constant 




























































































to the growth rate of the economy (GDP).
(IV.1) D = d*GDP ~ public deficit P





D dt - Public Debt 
P
+ (d’GDPQ/n)•(ent - 1 )
B




b = B/GDP = d/n
Table 2: DEBT/GDP ratios
e
One can only guess what the longer run nominal growth 
rate might happen to be. Somewhere between 5 - 1 0  per cent p.a. 
equally shared between real growth and inflation, seems for 
the time being not too unrealistic. This does not make the 
long run debt/GDP ratios look really frightening.




























































































to be paid on the debt? Three things become important: 1)
how big a share of the public debt is interest free (i.e. mon­
ey); 2) how high is the interest; 3) how much tax is paid on 
interest income. If all debts carry an interest obligation 
and are untaxed, then it is quite easy to calculate the size 
of the interest payments (I):




The share of the deficit going to interest payments 
is determined by the interest level and the nominal growth 
rate. If the rate of interest is equal to the growth rate 
then the entire deficit will be used for interest payments. 
Taking into consideration that the initial deficit was attrib­
uted to some external event, then the interest payments have 
in this case entirely overridden the initial deficit spending. 
This is, of course, one of the difficult political tasks, if 
and whether it is desirable to cut other public expenditures 
or to raise taxes to make room for the interest payments. The 
most delicate question is how the income distribution is af­
fected by the increased interest payments.
33. Due to difficulties in reducing the permanent deficit
for the sake of increasing interest payments, one could ask
under what condition will a constant deficit/GDP ratio, net of
6)interest payment, be possible:
(IV. 8) B/GDP = ---- r , n / i,
IT 1  -i D
d ~ Deficit/GDP (exclusive of interest payments and as­
sumed constant)




























































































i ~ nominal interest rate b
B ~ public debt (bonds and money)
Permanent deficit (excl. interest payments) 2 per cent of GDP;
Table 2b Debt/GDP ratio
8 1
10  1/2  1
- unstable development
IV.2. Nordic Stability?
34. Given this arithmetic, one may look at the past to 
see if the public debt is exploding or converging.
The situation is quite relaxed in Norway, Finland, 
and Iceland with regard to the overall debt development. On 
the contrary, one may judge the likely development in Sweden 
as uncertain and in Denmark as unstable. Bygones are bygones 
— except for the accumulated debt. Whatever policy measures 
are taken to correct the development in the future, a debt/GDP 
ratio of approximately 2/3 and a real rate of interest of ap­
proximately 6 per cent mean that 4 per cent of GDP is continu­
ously taken up by the holders of the public bonds. Even 
though the Debt/GDP ratio does not explode, there are consid­




























































































Table 3 Is the Public Debt Ratio Stable in the Nordic Countries
Average Figures for 1974-84 1)
average yearly change, 
per cent DK s N F
real GDP/capital 1.8 1 .4 3.2 2.4
n inflation 9.5 9.9 9.5 10.9
n 2)- nominal GDP/cap. 11.3 11.3 12.7 13.3
i - nominal interest 16.5 10.8 9.7 10.2
rate (long term)
(n 2)- i) ~ stability? -5.2 +0.5 +3.0 + 3.1
d - permanent public
deficit (excl. in- l . 3 2.2 - 4.2 -1.6terest)/GDP meas-
ured nercent. -
d/(n - i) ~ the "con,-.
stant" Debt/GDP + oo + 4.4 - 1.4 -0.5
ratio \
Actual (1984) Debt/GDP, 39.5 15.0 8.1 1.8
(per cent)
Actual (1984) permanent
deficit/GDP (excl^ in- 0.2 0.8 - 2.9 1 .6
terest), per cent '
Sources: OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-82, Paris 1984.
OECD, 1984b, chap. 2, tables 2, 5, 6, 7. Dansk
0konomi, November 1984 . Det /konomiske Rads
Formandskab, K0benhavn , 1984. Statistisk
M&nedsoversigt, Danmarks Statistik 1985/2.
Notes: 1) Definitions are in the text. Permanent deficit
is equivalent to what OECD calls "structural 
budget balance measured at trend (mid-cycle) 
output". There have been no attempts made to 
correct for taxes paid out of public interest 
payments.
2) Real growth rates and inflation rates have just 
been added; multiplication will not change the 
figures in any substantial way.




























































































IV.3 Possible policy conclusions.
When discussing the policy conclusions which one can 
derive from the analysis above, it might be useful to separate 
between cases where the debt-GDP ratio is unstable and those 
where the ratio seems to stabilise.
In the first cases some policy actions have to be un­
dertaken, because waiting for improved external conditions may 
undermine the economic performence and the political efficiency 
of the future. Whereas in those cases where the debt ratio grows 
with a decelerating speed —  or perhaps even starts to fall 
the pressure for political initiatives is much smaller. .
Some of the implications of a high but not growing debt may look 
rather frightening from an immediate consideration, and the higher 
this ratio is the more vulnerable is the country towards external 
events —  especially higher rates of interest and a slow down of 
the growth of the world economy.
I will structure the following analysis in accordance 
with the elements determinating the debt ratio, cfr. equation(IV:8)
1) The permanent deficit (excl. interest payments) - 'd'
2) The nominal growth of the economy - 'n'
3) The nominal rate of interest (net of tax) - 'i '
ad 1) The permanent deficit is basicly determined by the real
performance of each sector, cfr. equation (11:2):
Changes in the permanent deficit has temporary, but quite far reaching 
implications for the real growth of the economy 'g'. When the defen­
sive option in the form of contractive fiscal policy is favoured the 
economic growth is affected negatively. Contrary to that a reduction 
of the excess saving of the foreign sector through relative cost 
improvements or private sector through increased investment incen­
tives will stimulate the growth perspective. It should be stressed 
that an improved medium term growth performance is important when 
the debt ratio shall be brought down. A higher investment ratio 
opens for higher productivity gains and by that improved inter­
national competitiveness -- reducing the balance of payments and
a) public sector (raising taxes, cutting expences) (-g)
b) foreign sector (international competitiveness) (+g)





























































































ad 2) The nominal growth rate consists, of course, of two compo­
nents. One is the real growth 'g' which is unambiguously advan­
tageous for reducing the debt ratio. Increased inflation might 
look as an easy way of getting rid of the debt problem, but only 
the fear of further inflation may raise instantaneously th e  r a t e  
of interest and the favourable effects will evaporate quite soon.
ad 3) This brings us to the determinants of the nominal interest 
rate on the public debt (bonds and money). One can at least de­
tect 4 components:
a) real rate of interest - 'r*
b) inflation - 'p'
■c) Money/bond - ratio - 'M/B'
■d) tax rate on interest payments - 't'
IV.4 Reducing Public Deficit ('d')
a . Austerity Budget Policies
36. This is a politically touchy area. So I will try to
tiptoe through this minefield.
First of all, the main concern in this longer per­
spective should be devoted to the permanent deficit. What is 
the size of the deficit when the effect of cyclical movements 
in unemployment within the coming 5-10 years is corrected 
for? I do not plea for a calculation of the high employment 
deficit, because high (or full) employment may not be reached 
in our time. Any calculation grounded on the assumption that 
the economy will reach full employment may be rather rash. 
Although 5-10 years is quite a considerable span of time, it 
is not foreseen by any forecasting institution that high em­
ployment will have been reached within this horizon. In 




























































































improvement in the unemployment situation if no drastic
7)change in economic policy is assumed to take place.
One may, of course, wonder why a scenario with sub­
stantial unemployment is the most likely. The answer will 
be found in the constraints on the economy discussed in sec­
tion 14 above.
37. The size of the permanent deficit is a rough meas- 
averageure of the long run income support generated from the public 
sector transactions. Different expenditures and receipts 
have different multiplier effects and by that different im­
pacts on employment, balance of payments, inflation, etc.
The interest payments have a significant and cumulative impact, 
especially when the public deficit is matched by long run 
savings for pension purposes. Accordingly, there might one 
day in the future be a need for increased taxation, when 
these accumulated pensions are paid out. Then the need for 
income support will have decreased and the permanent deficit may be lowered.
In fact, the changing demographic pattern
of the society, where a larger proportion of the population 
becomes pensioners, implies a considerable obligation that 
ought to be added to the actual debt. From a social (and po­
litical) point of view it is very understandable that old- 
age pension schemes are improved; one could just argue that 
these future commitments ought to show up in the public sec­
tor accounts today.
At the macro level the need for autonomous income 
support diminishes pari passu with increased pension outlays. 
But at the micro level the distributional effect of higher 





























































































38. It is generally accepted that the higher the tax 
level the larger are the distortions in the functioning of 
the market economy. Again, it is a political question to 
choose the binding constraint (s) on the economy (expressed 
positively: the aims of the policy) and to decide upon the
choice between taxes and/or public spending cuts when the 
deficit is planned to be reduced.
Even though it is basically a political decision 
in which way to cut the budget deficit, the distortionary 
and multiplier effects are quite different, so a little 
economic reasoning should be allowed. In the Nordic con­
text with high automatic stabilizers in the form of high 
marginal tax rates, unemployment benefits, and (relatively 
high) marginal propensity to import, one more krone in tax 
revenue improves the public deficit much more strongly than
one krone cut in real expenses (especially on public employ-
. .  8 ) , 9 ) , 1 0 )ment) .
Anyhow, when the private sector in fact needs fur­
ther income support (i.e. a situation with unemployment) ■, 
it may seem rather contradictory to reduce public expenses, 
and more efficient policies to reduce the budget deficit 
should be contemplated.
b. Incomes (and exchange rate) Policies
39. Increased international competitiveness has a much
stronger effect on the deficit, because it at the same time
reduces the excess saving in both the foreign and private
sectors, reduces unemployment, and alleviates the balance
1 1 )of payments constraint. A lasting improvement in inter­
national competitiveness reduces the permanent public sec­
tor deficit. This strategy is mainly an option for small 





























































































40. When the new Swedish government took office in autumn 
1982, it carried through a cost improvement by devaluating the 
currency by 16 per cent. Doing so, it ran (and is still run­
ning) the risks of: 1) losing the cost-gains within a few
years and 2) in the (transitory?) period putting more strain 
on other weak countries' external balances. To the extent 
that these two risks are avoided or at least limited, one 
would expect the economy to start going through a virtuous cy­
cle containing: 1) balance of payments improvement, 2) reduc­
tion of the permanent budget deficit, and 3) a peaking up of 
private real investments. In this environment of improved 
competitiveness the government might even get through with 
further cuts in the permanent deficit without taking "the good 





























































































c. Reducing private excess saving
41. Following the same line of argumentation, increased 
private investments reduce the public deficit. The most sus­
tainable way of doing this is by improving the perspectives 
on future profit earnings. But if private investors are for 
one reason or another too gloomy about future prospects, the 
government can push them forward by some temporary investment 
subsidy. It is important that the support scheme be made 
time limited, otherwise investors continue their wait-and-see 
position. When the subsidies expire, the extra investments 
may have triggered off a multiplier-accelerator process which 
might improve the investors1 expectations enough to make the 
process self-contained. If so, two favourable effects emerge. 
First, the excess saving in the private sector decreases. 
Second, the potential growth rate increases.
Looking at private investments then the rate of in­
terest is also very important. So, the rate of interest has 
a dual role in determining the long run Debt/GDP. Lower 
rates of interest diminish the speed of the cumulative debt 
process and at the same time reduce the permanent deficit.
IV.5 Lowering the rate of interest
IV.5.a Administrative vs. market-oriented systems
42. if merely the rate of interest was always lower than
1 2 )the nominal growth rate, the public debt/GDP would be a 
stable relationship when the permanent deficit as a ratio of 
GDP stays constant.
At this point it is important to stress that the in­
terest term (i) in formula 8:
(IV.8) DEBT/GDP = — --r d ~ deficit/GDPn - i




























































































is the average after tax rate of interest on all public debt. 
I  -  I .
(IV.9) 1 = I = i *B aM + B
I ~ interest payments on the public net debt 
I ~ tax receipts from taxing public interest pay­
ments
m ~ monetized public debt (loan in the central bank) 
B ~ interest bearing public debt (internal and ex­
ternal)
i ~ the average nominal interest on circulating pub-
3.
lie bonds
According to this formula there are several options 
for reducing 'i ', so it becomes smaller than the nominal 
growth rate of the economy. The most obvious thing to do is 
to keep the nominal rate of interest well below the growth 
rate.
43. Keeping the rate of interest low might be difficult 
in a small, open economy. The national rate of interest is 
determined among other factors by the foreign rate of inter­
est. This link may be cut through capital control isolating 
the domestic credit markets from the rest of the world. Then
the national desired interest rate can be pursued by the mon-
1 3)etary authorities to a larger extent.
Anyhow, for a country running a considerable balance 
of payments deficit the domestic interest rate can only be 
untightened from the international one, if the government is 
ready to take up the necessary loans abroad to finance the 
deficit. The more the government borrows abroad. the more 




























































































society. In addition, it facilitates the internal conduct
of liquidity and interest rates when the private sector is
14)shielded from international capital markets.
44. The domestic interest rate is more easily conduct­
ed in countries with administratively fixed rates. In this 
respect the Nordic countries seem very different. Up until 
quite recently only Denmark had a market-determined long 
term rate of interest. Even for the short term rate (cer­
tificates of deposit issued by banks and Treasury Bills) it 
was not before the very late 1970's that steps towards a 
market-determined interest rate were taken in the other 
Nordic countries.
Such an administratively conducted financial sec­
tor will have severe difficulties in digesting public bonds 
amounting to e.g. 10 per cent of GDP p.a. (which was the 
situation in Sweden in the beginning of the 1980's) . Quite 
a number of enforcement rules on banks and other financial
institutions are necessary to keep up the demand for public
. - 15)bonds.
45. To what extent such an administratively regulated 
financial sector distorts the allocation of financial re­
sources is a matter of much dispute, see e.g. Jespersen, 
1984 and below.
The alternative is a financial sector left to the
1 6 )market forces. Of course, if the general equilibrium
conditions were fulfilled, the market-oriented financial 
sector would clearly be preferable. But the sad thing is 
that the performance of the economy does not live up to the 




























































































resources will be vacant for at least the next decade; actual 
output will grow more slowly than potential output due to, 
among other things, a low level of real investments.
IV.5.b The Market-Oriented Financial Regime
4 6. The crucial question is then, what kind of relation­
ship can be detected within the market-oriented financial 
sector between the interest level and the development in the 
public sector deficit and/or debt.
Figure _5 The Bond Market
Increased cyclical Increased permanent
deficit deficit
Note: The implicit dynamic process should be stressed. A
change in the cyclical deficit is generated from the 
private sector. Accordingly the change in the demand 
for financial assets increases initially. The lagged 
response of the public sector is crucial for the dy­
namic development of the interest rate, contrary to 




























































































If the disturbance originates from the private sec­
tor, for instance a decreased demand for real investment, 
then the (net) demand for bonds increases initially. Even if 
the change in public deficit is entirely financed by bond is­
sues, it is not likely to create excess supply. When the 
private income falls, the transaction demand for money will
also fall, which puts a downward pressure on the rate of in-
17)terest.
Quite a few empirical results, see e.g. OECD, 1984, 
support this conclusion that in the short run a higher cycli­
cal deficit tends to reduce the interest rate.
When changes in the permanent deficit are used as
regressor in empirical analyses, the result is reversed.
18)Higher permanent deficit as a share of GDP increases the
long term rate of interest. This situation emerges when the
government makes a discretionary fiscal action or when the
1 9)long run public debt increases as a share of GDP.
The last phenomenon happens when:
(IV.10a) n =£ i
d ,n ,i ~ the present expectations about:
permanent deficit (excl. interest pay­
ments)
nominal growth of GDP
nominal interest rate on public debt
p p pd ,n ,i ~ the expected new values of these varia­
bles




























































































IV.5.c Elaboration of the Interest Determination
(IV.11) 20)
—  +  +  ++ p p — — pf(g,n -n,n -m,m-m,d ,-
n






long term nominal interest rate
real GDP growth per capita (long run)
the difference between the expected nominal 
growth rate of GDP and the actual one
divergence of the actual money growth rate (m) 
from the declared one (m)
permanent public sector deficit (excl. inter­
est payments) as a ratio of long run per capi­
ta GDP in nominal terms
expected growth in nominal GDP
expected public debt service net of tax
expected long run public debt as a ratio of 
GDP (when nP - iP approaches zero or even be­
comes negative, bP grows without limit and a 
"bankruptcy" is expected. In an empirical 
analysis this situation may be captured by 1) 
dummy-values, 2) using (nP - ip + k), where k 
should be chosen appropriately)
expected inflation times the expected tax rate 
(in a nominalistic tax system a given after 
tax real rate of interest can only be obtained 
if the inflation is overcompensated in the 
nominal interest rate, cf. Feldstein
B-o-p ~ the current account deficit as a proportion of
exports of goods and services (perhaps GDP). 
Especially important for small countries rely­
ing on private capital imports
Cap. Control ~ the foreign rate of interest corrected for the 
± IL^ effect of capital control. The stricter capi­
tal control the smaller the impact from abroad 
(of course)




























































































47. Elements of a vicious cycle are incapsuled in this
equation. A higher long term rate of interest increases the
expected public debt which raises the interest even further.
Without knowing the exact values of the coefficients we do
not know how vicious the interaction is between a mounting
2 1)public sector deficit and the rate of interest. But tak­
ing the negative effect on real investment and the interna­
tional competitive position into consideration it is not 
surprising that the rate of interest becomes a hot issue, 
hearing the tic-tac from the debt-bomb.
IV.5.d Some political aspects of lowering the interest rate
48. However, the risk of a vicious cycle development 
may be reduced in a number of ways.
First, Europe could uncouple the link to the Ameri­
can rate of interest. The simplest and quickest way would 
be to introduce a kind of barrier towards the dollar zone. 
This barrier could take the form of old-fashioned capital 
restrictions, which the bureaucrats would love. A more 
flexible solution would be the introduction of VAT on trade 
in assets denominated in dollars (or other extra-European 
currencies). Then, if one wants to buy a dollar bond one is 
free to do so, one only has to pay the VAT on the transac­
tion to the government or the Community. Such a tax will, 
of course, remove much of the demand for extra-European as­
sets— and thus make the European rate of interest more inde­
pendent. Even in that case there still exists a risk that 
the market-determined rate of interest will stay high due to 





























































































49. Within the European countries which have not commit­
ted themselves to free capital movements, the possibility of a 
more administratively fixed rate of interest on the public 
debt is open. But the longer government bonds have been pre­
viously sold under free market conditions, the larger has the 
secondary market become. This might undermine any attempt to 
sell newly issued bonds at a price above the 'market clearing* 
price. Banks and other financial institutions (OFI) will ob­
ject to any enforcement rule put on them to take these bonds. 
They will see it as a discriminatory tax, which in fact it is. 
However, banks and IFOs have quite good possibilities of pass­
ing the tax further on to their customers. If, in addition, 
the banks' (and IFOs') loan rate is fixed, they can only pass 
the tax on by lowering the deposit rates. This may weaken 
their competitive position, which on the other hand reduces 
the growth rates of M1 and M2. Furthermore, a lower deposit 
rate means a lower alternative interest rate for bonds. This 
will make the secondary market move in the same direction as 
the administratively fixed one. Firms could also be asked to 
take up government bonds in some proportion to their financial 
surplus.
Coming so far, one might wonder if such a restricted 
system really has any net merits compared to the free market. 
What about credit rationing? Here one must not forget that 
the cause of the public sector deficit was assumed to be ex­
cess financial surplus in the private sector! The raison 
d'être of the "artificially" low rate of interest is lack of 
private real investments— and should not be regarded as a 
cheap way for the public sector to squeeze the private sector 




























































































rate of interest low even when the economy might boom is proba­
bly difficult to resist--especially when the accumulated debt 
is large.
One may judge for himself.
IV.5.e Concluding remarks on the conflict between deregulated 
capital markets and a mounting public debt
50. There seems to be a dangerous risk that periods with 
high permanent deficits go hand in hand with high real rates 
of interest. If that thread is not taken seriously, the vi­
cious cycle generating higher and higher deficits due to the 
interest dynamics seems quite likely. As we are going— by ac- 
cident--through that period of history in which the monetar­
ists' ideas are tested on the real world, high real rates of 
interest are not a risk but a fact in a number of dominant 
countries.
51. One may therefore ask how smaller countries can pro­
tect themselves against this regrettable international devel­
opment. Equation (IV.11) indicates that capital control may 
reduce the influence of the foreign rate of interest on the 
domestic one.
Raising the taxes on interest payments seems to in­
volve tne risk of being built into a higher level of interest. 
Of course, taxing previous tax-free interest payments is a 
rather obvious possibility, which has been pursued successful­
ly in Denmark. In this case a principle of real interest tax­




























































































tunately letting as much as 3— per cent real interest be de­
ductable. Anyhow, to me it seems quite unlikely that in the 
financial sectors governed by the market forces the real rate 
of interest will stay significantly below the real growth 
rate of the economy. One may therefore ask whether countries 
like Denmark (and Sweden), where the public debt is still 
mounting with a considerable speed and the permanent budget 
deficit has to be cut year by year due to the unstable con­
stellation of a higher real interest than real growth, were 
not better helped by an administratively fixed interest rate 
combined with a set of obligations to buy public bonds.
52. This opens the way for discussion of who has the 
best information and intention to fix the long term rate of 
interest, given a high level of disequilibrium within the 
real sector of the economy— the market or the politicians.
The hypothesis has been put forward by Boltho , 1983, that 
many of the deficit-plagued countries are trapped by adverse 
expectations. The financial sector is caught by monetarist . 
thinking, that higher public deficit means risk of increased inflation 
which immediately raises the rate of interest. The real sec­
tor reacts according to the Keynesian way of thinking with 
effective demand as the prime mover of the economy. Here an 
increased public deficit will stimulate the performance of 
the real sector, which will be knocked down by the higher 
rate of interest. Quite a deadlocking constellation, 





























































































IV.6 The temptation of increased inflation
53. From a short term political point of view there 
will be a temptation to exploit the lag between the actual 
rate of inflation and the average interest payment on the 
existing public debt (inclusive of money), cf. equation 
(IV.10a), especially when the public debt is mainly fi­
nanced through long term bonds (and money) with a fixed nom­
inal rate of interest. Then the option of letting the in­
flation rate grow may seem too irresistible. The increasing 
inflation may not even be a result of conscious conspiracy 
but a not unpleasant by-product of financing too much of the 
deficit by printing money. One may argue about the links 
from the growth of money to the rate of inflation. In a de­
pressed economy the relationship is probably rather diffuse 
and mainly working through expectations. The inflationary 
pressure builds up slowly and may be supported by currency 
devaluations and institutional arrangements like automatic 
price clauses in the wage regulation.
54. An example is given below, illustrating 'the pres­




























































































The permanent deficit (exclusive of interest payments) is as­
sumed to be 2 per cent of GDP.
22)The stock of money is 1/15 of GDP.
The stock of public bonds is 1/3 of GDP.
Miller, 1983, asks the question: if these ratios are supposed
to stay constant, how much inflation is needed to finance the 
deficit under different assumptions about real growth and real 
interest rate? The result is quite striking, cfr. table 4.
Table 4 The "Needed" Inflation
R ---yearly inflation---
e
a 0 30 35 40 45 50
1
g 1 24 29 34 39 44
r
o
w 2 18 23 28 33 38
t
h 3 12 1 7 22 27 32
r
a 4 6 11 16 21 26
t
e
Source: Miller, 1983, p. 7 (table 2).
Table 4 shows why a big deficit may add to the expectation of 
high future inflation. These expectations build into the 
present interest level, raising the actual real rate of inter­
est. The needed inflation could be somewhat reduced by allow­
ing the ratio of bonds to GDP to go up. According to equation 
( IV:11 ) this will put further pressure on the capital markets 




























































































55. Sargent & Wallace, 1981 and 1984, discuss with Darby, 
1984, in what cases financing the budget deficit necessarily 
leads to higher inflation. The conclusion of this discussion 
seems to be the one, which is also stressed in the present pa­
per, that the ratio between real after-tax interest rate and 
the real growth of the economy is the pivotal element of the 
analysis.
V. The 1 Real World 1 Adjustment
V.1 A Pessimistic View
56. Each year the public indebtedness grows, the govern­
ment's freedom to act is reduced. A mounting debt as a ratio 
of GDP means that relatively more and more resources go into 
interest payments. A foreign debt requires foreign exchange 
to be serviced, which immediately brings the balance of pay­
ments to the fore. The foreign debt cannot be serviced 
through higher taxes, but only through higher (net) export 
earnings. On the contrary, the domestic debt can be handled 
by higher (net) taxes. Here the main disadvantage is the 
distortion of the functioning of the market which puts a 
ceiling on the possible tax rates.
As long as the real rate of interest is lower than 
the real growth of the economy (and of (net) exports), the 
increasing debt may be financed through further indebtedness, 
because the debt/GDP ratio will ultimately stabilize. Howev­
er, the higher this long run ratio is, the more vulnerable 
the government will be to any external event.
Anyhow, in countries with a market-oriented finan­




























































































of interest in the US plays a dominant role for the domestic 
rate. As has been stressed in the text above, it seems more 
unlikely than ever that the real rate of interest in the US 
will fall from its 1984 peak of 7 1/2 per cent to any extent 
that might equilibrate the modest growth perspectives in Eu­
rope, of 2-3 per cent p.a. Accordingly, as any more funda­
mental change in the functioning of the financial sectors in 
Europe seems unlikely, the situation is rather deadlocked.
V.2 What has happened?
57. In many countries the real rate of interest is now 
at a level which makes a situation with a permanent deficit 
unstable. From table 5 one can see that although the actual 
budget deficit has risen by approximately 1.8 per cent of 
GDP in the OECD area in both the first and second oil price 
shocks, the underlying figures are quite different. Exclud­
ing (net) interest payments from the budgets shows that the 
extra fiscal impulse to the economies was nearly nil in the 
first period (rising from -1.0 (1973) to -1.2 (1979)), but 
was negative in the second period (-1.2 (1979) -0.4 (1984)).
This development implies that fiscal policy for the 
OECD area as a whole has contributed to the steep rise in 
unemployment and the slowdown of economic growth. A reduced 
growth rate in GDP over a period of 5 years or more increas­
es the debt/GDP ratio by widening the gap between real growth 
and real interest. Even if the interest payments are assumed 
to add to the level of final demand, one can see from the 2nd 
row in table 5 that, even including interest payments, the 




























































































Table 5 The Development in Budget Deficit during the Crisis





1. Actual budget balance 0.1 -1 .8 -3.6
2. Permanent budget balance -1 .9 -2.7 -2.4
3. Inflation adjusted nerma- 
nent budget balance -0.7 -0.8 -1 .1
4. Permanent budget balance 
net of (net) interest oayments -1 .0 -1 .2 0.4
notes: 1) General government
2) Concerning definitions; see text
Source: OECD, 1984b, chan. II, table 1,6,7,8.
The OECD area can be regarded as a closed economy (ex­
cept for oil and some other raw materials). Although marginal 
tax rates look high in many of the countries, the fact is that 
those with the highest risk of going unemployed (young people, 
women, and part-time workers) are those in the lower income 
brackets where tax rates are relatively low. For that reason 
the 'OECD-multiplier' of fiscal policy will be quite strong, as 
one may also read from the dramatic rise in the number of unem­
ployed persons in the second oil price period.
58. One may dig a little deeper into the changed develop­
ment of the role of the public sector to detect where the cuts 





























































































Table 6 Contributions of budget components to changes in the
permanent deficit of the OECD-countries from 1978 to 1984
( minus sign = move to higher permanent deficit)
A. Expenditures on goods and services: ---- per cent of GDP----
1) Consumption -0.2
2) Taxes +1.3
3) Real investments +0.2
B. Social security +0.6
C. Debt interest (net) -1.4
D. Total
Source: OECD, 1984b, chap. 2, table 3
+0.5
The change towards lower permanent deficit has been 
carried out mainly through tax increases. The public's demand 
for goods and services has been unchanged as a percentage of 
GDP.
Also (net) contributions to social security have gone 
up. They are more of a lump-sum character than are taxes, 
this implying that the distortionary consequences are (proba­
bly) smaller, but on the other hand add more strongly to the 
development of increased income inequality.
At the bottom of the table we find the effect of the 
higher debt-ratio and higher real interest rate. The interest 
burden has gone up by 1.4 per cent of GDP, exactly equilibrat­
ing the effect of higher taxes, from a bookkeeping point of 
view. Looking at how income distribution is affected, it is 
likely that the increased tax burden is more equally shared 
than the interest receipts. This, together with the increased 
social security contributions and unemployment, contributes to 




























































































59. What might be even more troublesome in the medium- 
term perspective is the decreased level of capital accumula­
tion. Lowering the demand for goods and services through 
budget cuts and tax increases reduces private real invest­
ments. Hereby the potential (and actual) growth is dimin­
ished, worsening the economic prospects as compared with a 
situation where either monetary or fiscal policy was less 
restrictive— preferably both.
V.3 What miaht come?
60. Let me conclude this essay by stressing that what
really matters in the medium and longer run perspective with 
regard to the public debt is the size of: 1) the permanent
deficit, 2) real growth of GDP, and 3) the real rate of in­
terest.
From an immediate point of view one might think 
that the appropriate medicine then would be: 1) fiscal pol­
icy, 2) inccmes(and exchange rate) policy, and 3) monetary, 
policy, depending on which 'debt-element' had the worst per­
formance, and on what had caused the initial deterioration.
But public debt problems are only one aspect of a 
much broader menu of political targets, where unemployment, 
inflation, balance of payments, and income distribution go 
in as well. Accordingly, one cannot say what the correct 
remedies for a mounting public debt are--at least not with­
out knowing the entire structure of political preferences.
One can only say that as long as the real rate of 
interest on the public debt exceeds the growth rate of the 




























































































like a strait jacket on the pursuit of other targets.
To stem the growing debt, a coordinated fiscal, in­
comes, and monetary policy is preferable. Even institution­
al changes within the financial sector have been contemplated.
Anyhow, as the freedom to act is rather limited for 
a single country, one cannot stress too strongly that what 
is really needed is an international coordinated policy to 
take in hand the low growth performance and high interest 
rates. Not before that has been established will the risk 



























































































NOTES; - 44 -
1) This paper shall be presented and discussed at Nordisk 0konomisk 
Forskningsrads conference on 'Longer Term Aspects of a mounting 
public Debt'. As it is planned to publish the paper in the year­
book any comments and critique will be highly appreciated.
The topic is rather political, so no unanimous conclusions can 
be achieved. However, I have aimed at a presentation of the main­
stream ideas - running the risk of underestimating some new but 
still unsettled contributions.
I have benefitted from presenting the paper at a workshop at the 
European University Institute in Firenze. Especially I want to 
thank my colleague Palle Svensson for our never ending discussion 
on these topics.
2) Short run is defined as the time period where the adjust­
ments to quantity changes are mainly of quantitative 
character.
3) Of course, a public sector deficit does not necessarily 
imply a surplus of both the private and the foreign sec­
tors. If the surplus of the foreign sector exceeds the 
public sector deficit then by definition the private sec­
tor is in deficit as well.
4) When the deficit measured as a share of the total public 
debt equals the growth rate of GDP, then the Debt/GDP ra­
tio will stabilize, cf. Johansen, 1965.
5) When a part of the deficit is financed by issuing money, 
the interest burden is somewhat reduced. Money financing 
is a temptation for a number of reasons, which I will 
come back to. This calculation should be made net of tax 
paid out of interest income.
6) OECD, 1984, p. 22. Also here the nominal rate of inter­
est should be interpreted as the average (net of tax) in­




























































































7) Here I mainly think of coordination of the economic poli­
cy among the bigger countries. Single country initiative 
is most likely to be short lasting, but a few opportuni­
ties are left open for smaller countries— I come to that.
8) On the other hand, lower taxes and a smaller public sec­
tor reduce the distortions of the market signals.
9) Higher taxes also have a lasting distortion effect on the 
nominal rate of interest, cfr. below.
10) Higher taxes or lower public demand will probably only 
lower the growth of GDP temporarily, but as mentioned in
the text, will increase unemployment permanently,
(ne-'Hence the ■'effect on \ - the permanent defi­
cit, is diminished.
11) I will not dwell on the discussion of pro et con related 
to a currency devaluation. That was in fact the topic for 
Nordisk 0konomisk Forskningsrad's conference last year.
12) Should I ever make a proposal for an amendment to the 
constitution, i would recommend this.
;13) Due to trade credit as an unavoidable link between na­
tional and international capital markets, one cannot ex- 
financial _ .. ,
pect total/isolation. vû ftWrrk'as a member of EEC has 
committed itself to reducing capital control--at least as 



























































































14) Quite often the argument is put forward that the govern­
ment cannot take up enough loans abroad to finance a sub­
stantial current deficit. If so, this is a further argu­
ment for getting rid of the balance of payments deficit.
15) For a certain period the requisite share of bank deposits
backed by government bonds was as high as 55 per cent in
Sweden. This of course made the figure for the money
supply— measured by M1— grow quite substantially, and in
1982 a market for treasury bills and in 1983 a market for
longer term government bonds were established. But still
a number of administrative regulations are kept in Sweden
— not to speak of the other Nordic countries— together
, officialwith some capital control. This means that the/alterna- 
tive rates of interest (to the bond rate) are held firmly 
by the ministry of finance, and the credit ceiling on bank 
loans is still maintained.
16) Here Keynes, 1936, chap. 12.5 could be cited, but I avoid­
ed the temptation.
17) This statement does only hold unconditionally in a well-
behaved 3-asset model (money, bond and real capital), cf. 
Friedman,1978.
18) Here one has to distinguish between current expenditures 
and capital expenditures (public investments). Capital 
expenditures raise the future public income either through 
a social rent and/or through pay-as-you-go taxes. But—  
and this is a big but— more often than not capital expend­
itures today add to current expenditures tomorrow when the 
schools, hospitals, and old-people's homes are operated by 




























































































19) When the expected long run ratio between public bond debt 
and GDP increases, the future interest burden goes up and 
this increases the permanent deficit (incl. interest pay­
ments) .
20) The sign of the derivatives is indicated above each vari­
able .
21) One should not overestimate the possibilities of getting 
these numbers from empirical calculation. As can be seen 
from equation (11) a great number of expected values go 
into the equation— and no appropriate method has yet come 
out to measure such figures. I leave the discussion of 
rational expectations for another time.
22) If the money growth rate were allowed to be accelerated, 
the "needed" inflation could be lower, but the expected 




























































































Boltho, A.:"Is Western Eurooe Caught in an 'Expectations Trap' 
LLoyds Bank Review, 1983
Babbs, S. & M.H. Miller: The True Cost of Debt Service and
the Public Sector Financial Deficit, Conference Paper, 
DORGA, 1984.
Barro, R.J.: "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?", Journal of
Political Economy, 1974.
Buiter, W.H.: "The Theory of Optimum Deficit and Debt", NBER
Working Paper, No. 1232, 1983.
Cukierman, A. & Jurgen Mortensen: "Monetary assets and in­
flation induced distortions of the national accounts - 
conceptual issues and correction of sectoral income 
flows in 5 EEC countries", Economic Papers No. 15, In­
ternal paper, The Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Commission of the European Communi­
ties, 1983.
Darby, M.R.: "Some Pleasant Monetarist Arithmetic", Fed.
Res. Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Spring 1984.
Eisner, R. & P. Pieper: "A New View of the Federal Debt and
Budget Deficits", American Economic Review, March 1984.
Feldstein, M.: "Inflation, Income Taxes, and the Role of In­
terest. A Theoretical Analysis", American Economic Re­
view, December 1976.
Friedman, B.: "Crowding Out or Crowding In? Economic Conse­
quences of Financing Government Deficits", Brookings Pa­
pers on Economic Activity, 3/1978.




























































































Jespersen, J. : Statsgcueldspolitik i de nordiske lande,
K0benhavn, 1984.
Johansen, T,. : "Of fentlig 0konomi", Oslo, 1965
Lybeck, J.:"Orsager til och Effecter av. 1982 ars devalverinqer i de
nordiska lande", discussion paper, University of Gothenburg, 1984
Masera, R.: "Monetary Policy and Budget Policy: Blend or
Dichotomy?", Chapter 5 in Masera, R. & R. Triffin (eds.): 
Europe's Money, Oxford, 1984.
Miller, P.J.: "Budget Deficit Mythology", Fed. Res. Bank of
Minneapolis, Quarterly Review, Fall 1983.
OECD: Budget Financing and Monetary Control, Monetary Studies
series, Paris 1982.
OECD: Public Sector Deficits, Problems and Policy Implica­
tions , Occasional Study, Paris, June 1983.
OECD: "Medium-Term Financial Strategy: The Co-ordination of
Fiscal and Monetary Policy", Economic Studies No. 2, 
1984a.
OECD: "Structural Budget Indicators and the Interpretation of
Fiscal Policy Stance in OECD Economies", Economic Studies 
No. 3, 1984b.
Sargent, T. & N. Wallace: "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arith­
metic", Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, Quarterly Review, 
Fall 1981.
Sargent, T. & N. Wallace: "A Reply to Darby", Fed. Res. Bank




























































































Spaventa, L.: "The Growth of Public Debt in Italy", Banca Na
zionale del Lavoro, Quarterly Review, 1984.
Sorensen, P.B.: "Er statens budgetunderskud rentedrivende?",
National/konomisk Tidsshrif t , 1/1984.






















































































































































































WORKING PAPERS ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT
1: Jacques PELKMANS The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries
3: Aldo RUSTICHINI Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest 
Rates
9: Manfred E. STREIT Information Processing in Futures 
Markets. An Essay on the Adequacy 
of an Abstraction
10: Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI When Workers Save and Invest: Some 
Kaldorian Dynamics




On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution
22: Don PATINKIN Paul A. Samuelson on Monetary Theory
23: Marcello DE CECCO Inflation and Structural Change in 
the Euro-Dollar Market
24: Marcello DE CECCO The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate 
in the '20s and the '70s
25: Manfred E. STREIT Modelling, Managing and Monitoring 
Futures Trading: Frontiers of 
Analytical Inquiry
26 : Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe: 
Prospects and Repercussions
34: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Modern Macroeconomic Theory: An 
Overview
35: Richard M. GOODWIN
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Economic Systems and their 
Regulation
46: Alessandra Venturini Is the Bargaining Theory Still an 
Effective Framework of Analysis 
for Strike Patterns in Europe?
47: Richard M. GOODWIN Schumpeter: The Man I Knew
48: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI 
Daniel SZPIRO
Politique de l'Emploi et Reduction 
de la Durée du Travail
56: Bere RUSTEM
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Preferences in Policy Optimization 



























































































No. 60: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI
No. 64: Marcello DE CECCO 
No. 65: Gianpaolo ROSSINI
No. 66: Wolfgang GEBAUER
No. 67: Gerd WEINRICH
No. 68: Saul ESTRIN
Derek C. JONES
No. 69: Bere RUSTEM
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
No. 72: Wolfgang GEBAUER
No. 75: Sheila A. CHAPMAN
No. 90: Will BARTLETT
No. 91: Wolfgang GEBAUER
No. 92: Elizabeth DE GHELLINCK 
Paul A. GEROSKI 
Alexis JACQUEMIN
84/103: Marcello DE CECCO 
84/105: Derek C. JONES
84/111: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
84/113: Domenico Mario NUTI
Adjusting to Competitive Depression. 
The Case of the Reduction in Working 
Time
Italian Monetary Policy in the 1980s
Intra-Industry Trade in Two Areas:
Some Aspects of Trade Within and 
Outside a Custom Union
Euromarkets and Monetary Control:
The Deutschmark Case
On the Theory of Effective Demand 
Under Stochastic Rationing
The Effects of Worker Participation 
upon Productivity in French 
Producer Cooperatives
On the Formalization of Political 
Preferences: A Contribution to 
the Frischian Scheme
Inflation and Interest: the Fisher 
Theorem Revisited
Eastern Hard Currency Debt 1970- 
1983. An Overview .
Unemployment, Migration and Indus­
trialization in Yugoslavia, 1958- 
1982
Kondratieff's Long Waves
Inter-Industry and Inter-Temporal 
Variations in the Effect of Trade 
on Industry Performance
The International Debt Problem in 
the Interwar Period
The Economic Performance of Producer 
Cooperatives within Command Economies: 
Evidence for the Case of Poland
A Non-Linear Model of Fluctuations 
in Output in a Mixed Economy





























































































84/114: Saul ESTRIN 
Jan SVEJNAR
84/116: Reinhard JOHN 
84/118: Pierre DEHEZ 
84/119: Domenico Mario NUTI
84/120: Marcello DE CECCO 
84/121: Marcello DE CECCO





84/128: Ugo PAGANO 
85/155: François DUCHENE 
85/156: Domenico Mario NUTI
85/157: Christophe DEISSENBERG
85/161: Domenico Mario NUTI
85/162: Will BARTLETT
85/169: Jean JASKOLD GABSZEWICZ 
Paolo GARELLA
Explanations of Earnings in Yugoslavia: 
the Capital and Labor Schools Compared
On the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference 
without Demand Continuity Assumptions
Monopolistic Equilibrium and Involuntary 
Unemployment
Economic and Financial Evaluation of 
Investment Projects: General Principles 
and E.C. Procedures
Monetary Theory and Roman History
International and Transnational 
Financial Relations
Modes of Financial Development:
American Banking Dynamics and World 
Financial Crises
Multisectoral Models and Joint 
Production
Employee Participation and Firm Perfor­
mance: a Prisoners' Dilemma Framework
Financial Model Building and Financial 
Multipliers of the Danish Economy
Welfare, Productivity and Self-Management
Beyond the First C.A.P.
Political and Economic Fluctuations in 
the Socialist System
On the Determination of Macroeconomic 
Policies with Robust Outcome
A Critique of Orwell's Oligarchic 
Collectivism as an Economic System
Optimal Employment and Investment 







































































































: Jean JASKOLD GABSZEWICZ 
Paolo GARELLA
Subjective Price Search and Price 
Competition
: Dwight M. JAFFEE Term Structure Intermediation
: Gerd WEINRICH Price and Wage Dynamics in a Simple
Macroeconomic Model with Stochastic 
Rationing
: Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Planning in Market Economies
: Will BARTLETT 
Gerd WEINRICH
Instability and Indexation in a Labour- 
Managed Economy - A General Equilibrium 
Quantity Rationing Approach
: Jesper JESPERSEN Some Reflexions on the Longer Term Con­
sequences of a Mounting Public Debt
: Jean JASKOLD GABSZEWICZ 
Paolo GARELLA
Scattered Sellers and Ill-Informed Buyers 
A Model of Price Dispersion
copies of these Working Papers can be obtained from:
Secretariat Economics Department 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana




























































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the European 
University Institute, Florence.
Copies can be obtained free of charge —  depending on the availability 
of stocks —  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole(FI) 
Italy



























































































P U B L I C A T I O N S  OF THE E U R O P E A N  U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE
To :The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana



































































































PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
EUI WORKING PAPERS
PUBLIC A T I O N S  OF THE EURO P E A N  UNIVE R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
1: Jacques PELKMANS The European Community and the Newly 
Industrialized Countries *
2: Joseph H.H. WEILER Supranationalism Revisited - 
Retrospective and Prospective. The 
European Communities After Thirty 
Years *
3: Aldo RUSTICHINI Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest 
Rates
4: Mauro CAPPELLETTI/ 
David GOLAY
Judicial Review, Transnational and 
Federal: Impact on Integration
5: Leonard GLESKE The European Monetary System: Present 
Situation and Future Prospects *
6: Manfred HINZ Massenkult und Todessymbolik in der 
national-sozialistischen Architektur *
7: Wilhelm BURKLIN The "Greens" and the "New Politics": 
Goodbye to the Three-Party System?
8: Athanasios MOULAKIS Unilateralism or the Shadow of 
Confusion *
9: Manfred E. STREIT Information Processing in Futures 
Markets. An Essay on the Adequacy of 
an Abstraction *
10:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI When Workers Save and Invest: Some 
Kaldorian Dynamics *
ll:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI A Neo-Cambridge Model of Income 
Distribution and Unemployment *
12:Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI/ 
Guglielmo CHIODI
On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution *
13:Gunther TEUBNER Reflexive Rationalitaet des Rechts *
14:Gunther TEUBNER Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modern Law *
15:Jens ALBER Some Causes and Consequences of Social 
Security Expenditure Development in 
Western Europe, 1949-1977 *




























































































P U B L I C A T I O N S  OF THE E U R O P E A N  UNIVE R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
16:Ian BUDGE Democratic Party Government: Formation 
and Functioning in Twenty-One 
Countries *
17:Hans DAALDER Parties and Political Mobilization: An 
Initial Mapping *
18:Giuseppe DI PALMA Party Government and Democratic 
Reproducibility: The Dilemma of New 
Democracies *
19:Richard S. KATZ Party Government: A Rationalistic 
Conception *
20:Juerg STEINER Decision Process and Policy Outcome: 
An Attempt to Conceptualize the 
Problem at the Cross-National Level *
21:Jens ALBER The Emergence of Welfare Classes in 
West Germany: Theoretical Perspectives 
and Empirical Evidence *
22:Don PATINKIN Paul A. Samuelson and Monetary Theory
23:Marcello DE CECCO Inflation and Structural Change in the 
Euro-Dollar Market *
24:Marcello DE CECCO The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in 
the '20s and the '70s *
25:Manfred E. STREIT Modelling, Managing and Monitoring 
Futures Trading: Frontiers of 
Analytical Inquiry *
26:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe - 
Prospects and Repercussions
27:Terence C. DAINTITH Legal Analysis of Economic Policy *
28:Frank C. CASTLES/ 
Peter MAIR
Left-Right Political Scales: Some 
Expert Judgements *
29:Karl HOHMANN The Ability of German Political 
Parties to Resolve the Given Problems: 
the Situation in 1982 *
30:Max KAASE The Concept of Political Culture: Its 
Meaning for Comparative Political 
Research *




























































































P U BLICATIONS OF THE EURO P E A N  UNIVE R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
31:Klaus TOEPFER Possibilities and Limitations of a 
Regional Economic Development Policy 
in the Federal Republic of Germany *
32-.Ronald INGLEHART The Changing Structure of Political 
Cleavages Among West European Elites 
and Publics *
33-.Moshe LISSAK Boundaries and Institutional Linkages 
Between Elites: Some Illustrations 
from Civil-Military Elites in Israel *
34:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Modern Macroeconomic Theory: An 
Overview *
35:Richard M. GOODWIN/ 
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Economic Systems and their Regulation*
36:Maria MAGUIRE The Growth of Income Maintenance 
Expenditure in Ireland, 1951-1979 *
37:G. LOWELL FIELD/ 
John HIGLEY
The States of National Elites and the 
Stability of Political Institutions in 
81 Nations, 1950-1982
38:Dietrich HERZOG New Protest Elites in the Political 
System of West Berlin: The Eclipse of 
Consensus? *
39:Edward 0. LAUMANN/ 
David KNOKE




Class and Prestige Origins in the 
American Elite
41:Peter MAIR Issue-Dimensions and Party Strategies 
in the Irish republic 1948-1981:The 
Evidence of Manifestos
42:Joseph H.H. WEILER Israel and the Creation of a Palestine 
State. The Art of the Impossible and 
the Possible «■
43:Franz Urban PAPPI Boundary Specification and Structural 




Zur Implementation von 
Gerichtsurteilen. Hypothesen zu den 
Wirkungsbedingungen von Entscheidungen 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts *




























































































P U B L I C A T I O N S  OF THE E U R O P E A N  U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
45:Alexis PAULY/ 
René DIEDERICH
Migrant Workers and Civil Liberties *
46:Alessandra VENTURINI Is the Bargaining Theory Still an 
Effective Framework of Analysis for 
Strike Patterns in Europe? *
47:Richard A. GOODWIN Schumpeter: The Man I Knew
48-.J.P. FITOUSSI/ 
Daniel SZPIRO
Politique de l'Emploi et Réduction de 
la Durée du Travail
49:Bruno DE WITTE Retour à Costa. La Primauté du Droit 
Communautaire à la Lumière du Droit 
International
50:Massimo A. BENEDETTELLI Eguaglianza e Libera Circolazione dei 
Lavoratori: Principio di Eguaglianza e 
Divieti di Discriminazione nella 
Giurisprudenza Comunitaria in Materia 
di Diritti di Mobilità Territoriale e 
Professionale dei Lavoratori
51: Gunther TEUBNER Corporate Responsability as a Problem 
of Company Constitution *
52:Erich SCHANZE Potentials and Limits of Economic 
Analysis: The Constitution of the Firm
53:Maurizio COTTA Career and Recruitment Patterns of 
Italian Legislators. A Contribution of 
the Understanding of a Polarized 
System *
54:Mattei DOGAN How to become a Cabinet Minister in 
Italy: Unwritten Rules of the 
Political Game *
55:Mariano BAENA DEL ALCAZAR/ 
Narciso PIZARRO




Preferences in Policy Optimization and 
Optimal Economic Policy
57:Giorgio FREDDI Bureaucratic Rationalities and the 
Prospect for Party Government *
59 : Christopher Hill/ 
James MAYALL
The Sanctions Problem: International 
and European Perspectives




























































































P U B L I C A T I O N S  OF THE EURO P E A N  U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
60:Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Adjusting to Competitive Depression. 
The Case of the Reduction in Working 
Time
61rPhilippe LEFORT Idéologie et Morale Bourgeoise de la 
Famille dans le Ménager de Paris et le 
Second Libro di Famiglia, de L.B. 
Alberti *
62:Peter BROCKMEIER Die Dichter und das Kritisieren
63:Hans-Martin PAWLOWSKI Law and Social Conflict
64:Marcello DE CECCO Italian Monetary Policy in the 1980s *
65:Gianpaolo ROSSINI Intraindustry Trade in Two Areas: Some 
Aspects of Trade Within and Outside a 
Custom Union
66:Wolfgang GEBAUER Euromarkets and Monetary Control : The 
Deutschemark Case




The Effects of Worker Participation 




On the Formalization of Political 
Preferences: A Contribution to. the 
Frischian Scheme *
70:Werner MAIHOFER Politique et Morale *
71:Samuel COHN Five Centuries of Dying in Siena: 
Comparison with Southern France *
72:Wolfgang GEBAUER Inflation and Interest: the Fisher 
Theorem Revisited
73:Patrick NERHOT Rationalism and the Modern State *
74:Philippe SCHMITTER Democratic Theory and Neo-Corporatist 
Practice *
75:Sheila A. CHAPMAN Eastern Hard Currency Debt 1970-83. An 
Overview




























































































P U B L I C A T I O N S  OF THE E U R O P E A N  U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
76:Richard GRIFFITHS Economic Reconstruction Policy in the 
Netherlands and its International 
Consequences, May 1945 - March 1951 *
77:Scott NEWTON The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British 
Policy towards European Integration *
78:Giorgio FODOR Why did Europe need a Marshall Plan in 
1947? *
79:Philippe MIOCHE The Origins of the Monnet Plan: How a 
Transistory Experiment answered to 
Deep-Rooted Needs
80:Werner ABELSHAUSER The Economic Policy of Ludwig Erhard
81:Helge PHARO The Domestic and International 
Implications of Norwegian 
Reconstruction
82:Heiner R. ADAMSEN Investitionspolitik in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1951 *
83:Jean BOUVIER Le Plan Monnet et l'Economie Française 
1947-1952 *
84:Mariuccia SALVATI Industrial and Economie Policy in the 
Italian Reconstruction *
85:William DIEBOLD, Jr. Trade and Payments in Western 
Europe in Historical Perspective: 
A Personal View By an Interested 
Party
86:Frances LYNCH French Reconstruction in a European 
Context
87:Gunther TEUBNER Verrechtlichung. Begriffe, Merkmale, 
Grenzen, Auswege *
88:Maria SPINEDI Les Crimes Internationaux de l'Etat 
dans les Travaux de Codification de la 
Responsabilité des Etats Entrepris par 
les Nations Unies *
89 :Jelle VISSER Dimensions of Union Growth in Postwar 
Western Europe
90:Will BARTLETT Unemployment, Migration and 
Industrialization in Yugoslavia, 1958- 
1977




























































































P U B LICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
91:Wolfgang GEBAUER Kondratieff's Long Waves
92:Elisabeth DE GHELLINCK/ 
Paul A. GEROSKI/
Alexis JACQUEMIN
Inter-Industry and Inter-Temporal 






durch Reflexives Recht *
94:Wolfgang STREECK/
Philippe C. SCHMITTER
Community, Market, State- and 
Associations. The Prospective 
Contribution of Interest Governance 
to Social Order
95:Nigel GRIFFIN "Virtue Versus Letters": The Society 
of Jesus 1550-1580 and the Export of 
an Idea
96:Andreas KUNZ Arbeitsbeziehungen und 
Arbeitskonflikte im oeffentlichen 
Sektor. Deutschland und 
Grossbritannien im Vergleich 1914-1924 *
97:Wolfgang STREECK Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations 
and the Economic Crisis in West 
Germany *
98:Simon A. HORNER The Isle of Man and the Channel 
Islands - A Study of their Status 
under Constitutional, International 
and European Law
99:Daniel ROCHE Le Monde des Ombres
84/100:Gunther TEUBNER After Legal Instrumentalism? *
84/101:Patrick NERHOT Contribution aux Débats sur le Droit 
Subjectif et le Droit Objectif comme 
Sources du Droit *
84/102:Jelle VISSER The Position of Central Confederations 
in the National Union Movements
84/103:Marcello DE CECCO The International Debt Problem in the 
Inter-War Period
84/104:M. Rainer LEPSIUS Sociology in Germany and Austria 1918- 
1945. The Emigration of the Social 
Sciences and its Consequences. The




























































































P U B L I C A T I O N S  OF THE E U R O P E A N  UNIVE R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
Development of Sociology in Germany 
after the Second World War, 1945-1967
84/105:Derek JONES The Economic Performances of Producer 
Cooperations within Command Economies: 
Evidence for the Case of Poland
84/106:Philippe C. SCHMITTER Neo-Corporatism and the State *
84/107:Marcos BUSER Der Einfluss der Wirtschaftsverbaende 
auf Gesetzgebungsprozesse und das 
Vollzugswesen irn Bereich des 
Umweltschutzes
84/108:Frans van WAARDEN Bureaucracy around the State:Varieties 
of Collective Self-Regulation in the 
Dutch Dairy Industry
84/109 : Ruggero RANIERI The Italian Iron and Steel Industry 
and European Integration




A Non-Linear Model of Fluctuations in 
Output in a Mixed Economy
84/112:Anna Elisabetta GALEOTTI Individualism and Political Theory
84/113 : Domenico Mario NUTI Mergers and Disequilibrium in Labour- 
Managed Economies
84/114:Saul ESTRIN/Jan SVEJNAR Explanations of Earnings in 
Yugoslavia: The Capital and Labor 
Schools Compared
84/115:Alan CAWSON/John BALLARD A Bibliography of Corporatism
84/116 : Reinhard JOHN On the Weak Axiom of Revealed 




The FRITALUX/FINEBEL Negotiations 
1949/1950
84/118:Pierre DEHEZ Monopolistic Equilibrium and 
Involuntary Unemployment
84/119:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic and Financial Evaluation of 
Investment Projects; General 
Principles and E.C. Procedures




























































































PUBLIC A T I O N S  OF THE E U R O P E A N  U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
84/120:Marcello DE CECCO Monetary Theory and Roman History
84/121:Marcello DE CECCO International and Transnational 
Financial Relations
84/122:Marcello DE CECCO Modes of Financial Development: 




Multisectoral Models and Joint 
Production
84/124:John FARQUHARSON The Management of Agriculture and 
Food Supplies in Germany, 1944-47
84/125:Ian HARDEN/Norman LEWIS De-Legalisation in Britain in the 
1980s *
84/126:John CABLE Employee Participation and Firm 
Performance. A Prisoners' Dilemma 
Framework
84/127:Jesper JESPERSEN Financial Model Building and 
Financial Multipliers of the 
Danish Economy
84/128:Ugo PAGANO Welfares, Productivity and Self- 
Management
84/129:Maureen CAIN Beyond Informal Justice *
85/130:0tfried HOEFFE Political Justice - Outline of a 
Philosophical Theory
85/131:Stuart J. WOOLF Charity and Family Subsistence: 
Florence in the Early Nineteenth 
Century
85/132:Massimo MARCOLIN The Casa d’Industria in Bologna during 
the Napoleonic Period: Public Relief 
and Subsistence Strategies
85/133:Osvaldo RAGGIO Strutture di parentela e controllo 
delle risorse in un'area di transito: 
la Val Fontanabuona tra Cinque e 
Seicento
85/134-.Renzo SABBATINI Work and Family in a Lucchese Paper- 
Making Village at the Beginning of the 
Nineteenth Century




























































































P U B L I C A T I O N S  OF THE E U R O P E A N  U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
85/135:Sabine JURATIC Solitude féminine et travail des 
femmes à Paris à la fin du XVIIIème 
siècle
85/136:Laurence FONTAINE Les effets déséquilibrants du 
colportage sur les structures de 
famille et les pratiques économiques 
dans la vallée de l'Oisans, 18e-19e 
siècles
85/137:Christopher JOHNSON Artisans vs. Fabricants: Urban 
Protoindustrialisation and the 
Evolution of Work Culture in 
Lodève and Bédarieux, 1740-1830
85/138:Daniela LOMBARDI La demande d'assistance et les répon­
ses des autorités urbaines face à 
une crise conjoncturelle: Florence 
1619-1622
85/139:0rstrom MOLLER Financing European Integration: 
The European Communities and the 
Proposed European Union.
85/140:John PINDER Economic and Social Powers of the 
European Union and the Member States: 
Subordinate or Coordinate Relation­
ship
85/141:Vlad CONSTANTINESCO La Repartition des Competences 
Entre l'Union et les Etats Membres 
dans le Projet de Traite' Instituant 
l'Union Européenne.
85/142:Peter BRUECKNER Foreign Affairs Power and Policy 
in the Draft Treaty Establishing 
the European Union.
85/143:Jan DE MEYER Belgium and the Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union.
85/144:Per LACHMANN The Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union:
Constitutional and Political 
Implications in Denmark.
85/145:Thijmen KOOPMANS The Judicial System Envisaged in 
the Draft Treaty.
85/146:John TEMPLE-LANG The Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union and the Member




























































































PUBLIC A T I O N S  OF THE E U R O P E A N  U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
States: Ireland
85/147:Carl Otto LENZ The Draft Treaty Establishing the 
European Union: Report on the Fede­




The Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union: Report on the United 
Kingdom
85/149:Joseph J. M. VAN DER VEN Les droits de l'Homme: leur universa­
lité' en face de la diversité' des 
civilisations. *
85/150:Ralf ROGOWSKI Meso-Corporatism and Labour Conflict 
Resolution *
85/151:Jacques GENTON Problèmes Constituionnels et Politi­
ques poses en France par une éventuel­
le ratification et mise en oeuvre du 
projet de Traite d'Union Européenne
85/152:Marjanne de KWAASTENIET Education as a verzuiling phenomenon 
Public and independent education in 
the Nederlands
85/153 Gianfranco PASQUINO 
and Luciano BARDI
The Institutions and the Process of 
Decision-Making in the Draft Treaty
85/154:Joseph WEILER
and James MODRALL
The Creation of the Union and Its 
Relation to the EC Treaties
85/155:François DUCHENE Beyond the first C.A.P.
85/156:Domenico Mario NUTI Political and Economic Fluctuations 
in the Socialist System
85/157:Gianfranco POGGI Niklas Luhmann on the Welfare State 
and its Law
85/158:Christophe DEISSENBERG On the Determination of Macroeconomic 
Policies with Robust Outcome
85/159:Pier Paolo D'ATTORRE ERP Aid and the Problems of 
Productivity in Italy during the 1950s
85/160:Hans-Georg DEGGAU Ueber einige Voraussetzungen und 
Folgen der Verrechtlichung
85/161 : Domenico Mario NUTI Orwell's Oligarchic Collectivism as an 
Economic System




























































































P U B L I C A T I O N S  OF THE EURO P E A N  U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE May 1985
85/162:Will BARTLETT Optimal Employment and Investment 
Policies in Self-Financed Produce 
Cooperatives
85/163:Terence DAINTITH The Design and Performance of Long­
term Contracts
85/164:Roland BIEBER The Institutions and Decision-Making 
Process in the Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union
85/165:Philippe C. SCHMITTER Speculations about the Prospective 
Demise of Authoritarian Regimes and 
its possible Consequences
85/166:Bruno P. F. WANROOIJ The American 'Model' in the Moral 
Education of Fascist Italy
85/167:Th. E. ABELTSHAUSER/ 
Joern PIPKORN
Zur Entwicklung des Europaeischen 
Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrechts
85/168:Philippe MIOCHE Les difficultés de la modernisation 
dans le cas de l'industrie française 






Subjective Price Search and Price 
Competition
85/171:Hans-Ulrich THAMER Work Practices of French Joiners and 
Cabinet-Makers in the Eighteenth 
Century







Political Exchange in the Italian
85/175:Michela NACCI Tra America e Russia: Viaggiatori 
francesi degli anni trenta
85/176:J.LOUGHLIN The Corsican Statut Particulier: A 
Response to the Problem Corse



























































































P U BLICATIONS OF THE E U R O P E A N  U N I V E R S I T Y  INSTITUTE 1985
85/177:Alain DIECKHOFF L'Europe Politique et le Conflit 
Israelo-Arabe
85/178:Dwight J. JAFFEE Term Structure Intermediation by 
Depository Institutions
85/179:Gerd WEINRICH Price and Wage Dynamics in a Simple 
Macroeconomic Model with Stochastic 
Rationing
85/180:Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Planning in Market Economies: 
Scope, Instruments, Institutions
85/181:Will BARTLETT Enterprise Investment and Public 
Consumption in a Self-Managed Economy
85/182:Alain SUPIOT Groupes de Societes et Paradigme de 
1'Entreprise
85/183:Susan Senior Nello East European Economic Relations: 
Cooperation Agreements at Government 
and Firm Level
85/184:Wolfgang WESSELS Alternative Strategies for 
Institutional Reform
85/185:Ulrich BAELZ Groups of Companies - the German 
Approach: "Unternehmen" versus 
"Konzern"
85/186:Will BARTLETT and 
Gerd WEINRICH
Instability and Indexation in a 
Labour-managed Economy
85/187:Jesper JESPERSEN Some Reflections on the Longer Term 
Consequences of a Mounting Public Debt
85/188:Jean GABSZEWICZ
and Paolo GARELLA
Scattered Sellers and Ill-informed 
Buyers: A Model for Price Dispersion
85/189:Carlo TRIGILIA Small-firm Development, Political 
Subcultures and Neo-localism in 
Italy
85/190:Bernd MARIN Generalized Political Exchange. 
Preliminary Considerations
* :Working Paper out of p rint
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
